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OBSERVATIONS ON UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION PAYMENTS
Unemployment Compensation payments to claimants whose eligibility
for payment and/or availability for work is questionable impose a burden
upon the Unemployment Compensation Fund of approximately $40 million
a year. Critics of the law as it has been interpreted decry such payments,
called "loophole payments". They insist that legislation be enacted in order
to preclude them.
The Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Law, enacted in 1936
through the inducement of, and in conformity with, the Federal Govern-
ment's Social Security Act, has been the subject of controversy from the date
of its enactment to the present day. Its constitutionality has been vigorously
attacked 1 and its purpose and policy severely criticised. However, most
of its adversaries, who have attacked the use of the police power for such
sociological reform, have either fallen into silence or revised their thinking
in the face of strict adherence by the lawmaking bodies to the principles be-
hind the law.
During the recent recession unemployment compensation laws were given
credit by Federal Government Economists for alleviating the economic hard-
ship which accompanies unemployment, thereby helping to prevent a major
depression. In order to fulfill their share of this task, the administrators of
the Pennsylvania fund extended payment to half again the number of weeks
to which a claimant is ordinarily entitled. This fact, along with chronic un-
employment in four major areas of the Commonwealth, caused a serious de-
preciation of the reserve fund.-
The depletion of the fund has caused critics to seek revisions in the law
in order to stop payments which are technically within the law, but outside
its stated purpose. These "loophole payments" concern persons who, al-
though unemployed, are not honestly seeking new employment and who are
removed from the labor market, but are still drawing jobless benefits. It is
the purpose of this article to discuss some of the loopholes which make this
possible. A necessary pre-requisite to such discussion is a knowledge of the
provisions of the law pertaining to eligibility and those dealing with policy
and interpretation.'
1 Boyerstown Burial Casket Co. v. Commonwealth, 366 Pa. 574, 79 A.2d 449 (1951); Com-
monwealth v. Perkins, 342 Pa. 529, 21 A.2d 45 (1941), aff'd 314 U.S. 586 (1942).
2 The Declaration of Public Policy is as follows:
Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals, and
welfare of the people of the Commonwealth. Involuntary unemployment and its resulting bur-
( 344]
In general the law limits payments to persons unemployed through no
fault of their own, and to those who are in good faith able and available for
suitable work.
The Courts have used the public policy provisions of the act as a corollary
to specific provisions. In International Furniture Company v. Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review it was said:
(Declaration of Public Policy of unemployment compensation law) "must
be considered in construing every provision of the statute and in determining
eligibility for benefits in every case." 3
But there sometimes is a conflict as to just which way the policy was
intended to lead the courts-a strict administration of the law: 4
. . .his resulting idleness while receiving retirement income is not the
type of economic insecurity due to involuntary unemployment without fault
which was within the contemplation of the legislature in the enactment of the
Unemployment Compensation Law."
or a more relaxed administration: '
. . .the cardinal principle under which the Unemployment Compen-
sation Act is administered is that an employee in covered employment can be
denied its benefits only by explicit language in the act which clearly and plainly
excludes him."
The qualifications for claimants are generally based upon wages earned,
time worked previous to filing, registration for work, ability to perform and
availability for suitable work, and good faith.'
den of indigency falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker, and ultimately upon
the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions in the form of poor relief assistance. Security
against unemployment and the spread of indigency can best be provided by the systematic
setting aside, of financial reserves to be used as compensation for loss of wages by employes
during periods when they became unemployed through no fault of their own. The principal
of accumulation of financial reserves, the sharing of the risks, and the payment of compensa-
tion with respect to unemployment meets the needs of protection against the hazards of unem-
ployment or indigency. The Legislature therefore declares that in its considered judgment
the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of the Commonwealth require the exer-
cise of the police power of the Commonwealth in the enactment of this act for the compul-
sary setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed
through no fault of their own. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 752 (1952).
3 185 Pa. Super. 235, 239, 138 A.2d 207, 209 (1938).
4 Warner Company v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 186 Pa. Super. 186, 190,
142 A.2d 739, 740 (1958).
5 Bliley Electric Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 158 Pa. Super. 548, 559,
45 A.2d 898, 904 (1946).
6 The qualifications for securing unemployment compensation payments are contained in PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 801, 802 (1952). The following are the applicable provisions of these
sections.
Sec. 801 Compensation shall be payable to any employe who is or becomes unemployed, and
who-
(a) Has, within his base year, been paid wages for employment equal to not less than
thirty (30) times his weekly benefit rate;
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The loophole claimants who will be discussed in this article are those
unemployed by reason of retirement or pregnancy, married women who have
left their employment to live with their husbands, and "Double Dippers"
(claimants who register for a second round of benefits on the basis of the
same lay-off used in the first round).
RETIRED WORKERS
More than half the reported loophole payments each year are made to
retired workers. In the second calendar quarter of 1958, although the amount
of unemployment compensation paid was extremely high, retired workers
collected six cents of every dollar paid."
It was in 1950, fourteen years after the enactment of the law, that a de-
cision was first rendered by an appellate court on the question of eligibility
of a person receiving a pension.' At that time no other appellate court of
any jurisdiction had been called upon to meet the problem. The Pennsylva-
nia Superior Court, in remanding the case, declared that the receipt of pen-
sion payments alone would not be sufficient to disqualify a claimant from
unemployment compensation benefits. The court likened pension benefits
to receipts from private investments, but cautioned that it would be another
question if the pension plan under which the claimant was drawing benefits
had provisions which would force him to choose between the pension and
further employment.
(b) Has registered for work at, and thereafter continued to report at, an employment
office in accordance with such regulations as the secretary may prescribe ...
(d) Is able to work and available for suitable work. Provided, that a claimant shall
be conclusively presumed to be unavailable for work with respect to any week of un-
employment after seven and one-half months of pregnancy and until after thirty days
of confinement.
(e) Has been unemployed for a waiting period of one week.
(f) Has, Subsequent to his voluntarily leaving work without good cause or to his dis-
charge or suspension from work for willful misconduct connected with his work,
been paid remuneration for services in an amount equal to or in excess of eight
(8) times his weekly benefit rate irrespective of whether or not such services were
in "employment" as defined in this act.
Sec. 802 Ineligibility of Compensation
An employe shall be ineligible for compensation for any week-
(a) In which his unemployment is due to failure, without good cause, either to apply for
suitable work at such time and in such manner as the department may prescribe, or
to accept suitable work when offered to him by the employment office or by any
employer, irrespective of whether or not such work is in "employment" as defined
in this act: Provided, that such employer notifies the employment office of such offer
within three (3) days after the making thereof.
(b) In which his unemployment is due to voluntary leaving work without cause of a
necessitous and compelling nature. . .
("Employment" as defined in the acts is to include those jobs which have been desig-
nated by the legislature as covered employment.)
7 Pennsylvania Chamber of Commerce, Legislative Spotlight (January, 1959).
8 Keystone Mining Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 167 Pa. Super. 256, 75
A.2d 3 (1950).
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Since this decision there have been other restrictions imposed upon pay-
ment of benefits to a retired worker. A claimant cannot voluntarily retire
and collect jobless pay,' nor can he be eligible for unemployment compensa-
tion if he retires as a result of a collective bargaining agreement which makes
retirement mandatory.1" The theory in the latter case is that the union is his
agent and signs the contract for him. Therefore he is a party to the contract
and he has agreed to retire. In this case the court held his retirement volun-
tary, in the legal sense, and precluded him from asserting involuntary un-
employment.
A retired claimant's unemployment must be involuntary, both actually
and legally, or the result of a "necessitous and compelling reason".11 Many
claimants, in order to qualify under "necessitous and compelling", complain
to the employer that their particular job is affecting their health. If they are
not given more suitable work, they leave the employment, collect the pension
benefits and apply for unemployment compensation. The claimant's burden
of demonstrating that he is "able and available for suitable work" 12 is ful-
filled by having his physician complete a form provided by the bureau con-
cerning his physical capacities. It is a rare case indeed where a claimant's
own physician will find that he is unable to do any kind of work.
Those who are disqualified because their retirement is voluntary (legally
or actually) can remove the disqualification, and receive benefits based upon
wages earned in the position from which they are retired, by earning eight
times the weekly benefit rate to which they would have been entitled had
there been no disqualification.1" The work is not required to be in "covered
employment" (employment of the type necessary to qualify for benefits),
so it is relatively easy for the claimant to obtain such employment. Some of
these persons obtain seasonal work of an agricultural nature. When the work
ends the claimant is unemployed because of "lack of work" and, since the
maximum unemployment compensation rate is $35 per week, $280 (eight
times $35) is the most that he must earn to remove the disqualification.
Since the first Pennsylvania decision, Connecticut and New Jersey have
faced the basic problem of whether retired workers who received pensions
should be entitled to benefits. The Connecticut court held that the claimant
9 Hall v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 160 Pa. Super. 65, 49 A.2d 872 (1946);
Campbell Unemployment Compensation Case, 180 Pa. Super. 74, 117 A.2d 799 (1955); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 802(b) (1953).
10 Warner Company v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 186 Pa. Super. 186, 142
A.2d 739 (1958).
11 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 802(b) (1953).
12 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 801(d) (1953).
13 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 801(f) (1953).
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was not entitled to benefits while he was receiving pension payments. 4 The
court reasoned that the pension payments served the same purpose as wages
and were a substitute for wages that had been lost due to unemployment.
This was sufficient to disqualify him although pension payments do not
come under the meaning of the term "wages" as used in their unemployment
compensation law.
The New Jersey court refused benefits to one who retired pursuant to
a collective bargaining agreement which made retirement mandatory. 5 In that
case there was dicta to the effect that it was not the purpose of the law to
render assistance to a planned retirement program. But, in the same year, a
claimant who left work for good cause and collected a pension was allowed
unemployment compensation benefits by the New Jersey court.16 The court
stated that the fact that he was collecting a modest pension did not conclusively
establish that he was not able, ready, or willing to work.
It would seem that the New Jersey courts have achieved the same result
as Pennsylvania. The Connecticut court, however, refuses to recognize the
analogy between pension payments and receipts from income producing prop-
erty or other private means. Their position is that pension payments preclude
unemployment compensation payments.
PREGNANT WOMEN
According to the statute a pregnant woman will be considered eligible
for unemployment compensation benefits except for a period of approximately
two and one-half months before the birth and 'thirty days afterward. 7 Of
course the pregnant woman is required to meet the other requirements of the
Act pertinent to eligibility, but, as with pensioners, this burden is light.
To avoid having her severance from employment considered voluntary
the pregnant woman requests lighter work commensurate with her condition.
If there is none available she leaves her employment for "necessitous and com-
pelling" reasons. The fact that she is narrowly restricted in her availability
for employment, both because of her inability to perform certain tasks and
the natural reluctance of employers to hire a pregnant woman, has no effect
upon her qualification. Indeed, the statute, by specifically authorizing pay-
ments to pregnant women until a certain time, precludes any such contention.
14 Kneeland v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 138 Conn. 630, 88 A.2d 376
(1952).
15 Campbell Soup Co. v. Bd. of Review, 24 N.J. Super. 311, 94 A.2d 514 (1953).
16 Krauss v. A & M Karagheusian Inc., 24 N.J. Super. 277, 94 A.2d 339 (1953). Claimant
received $10.90 per month pension.
17 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 801(d) (1953).
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However, since the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision in the claim
of Lois Rainbow Smith, decided on January 2, 1959, it is possible that most,
if not all, pregnant women will be precluded from benefits by way of com-
pany policy.18 In the Smith case the claimant was informed at the time she
began her employment 'that there was a company policy prohibiting women
from working beyond their fifth month of pregnancy. Later she signed a
statement to the effect that she had been informed of all company policies
and agreed to abide by them. The court decided that her agreement to abide
by the regulations became a condition of her employment. Her subsequent
unemployment due to pregnancy was therefore declared voluntary within the
meaning of the unemployment compensation law.
In effect the court decided that an employer's policy, universally enforced,
of which claimant has been notified will, if violated, cause pregnant claim-
ants to be declared ineligible for benefits. The court ruled that the policy
was intended to safeguard and protect employees in such a physical state
from possible accident, not only while working but from conditions arising
out of and incidental to the employment, and therefore was a reasonable con-
dition. To the contention that this was doing indirectly what could not be
done directly, i.e., forcing an employee to sign away rights to unemployment
compensation in violation of the statute,1" the court answered that since this
was a legitimate condition of employment it was not the type meant to be
barred.
In support of the contention that no pregnant women should be allowed
-to receive benefits, it has been asserted that they are not in the class of persons
intended to be protected from the hazards of unemployment. Since they are
so restricted, in their availability for work it is a near certainty that they will
be unable to procure work and will receive benefits for the entire period
covered by the statute. Also, it is claimed, most of them are not honestl y
seeking work after the birth of the child, but merely drawing benefits as long
as they can while avoiding proffered employment.
On the other hand, this latter contention is a matter of fact in the in-
dividual case. Supporters of the payment of benefits contend that pregnant
women are of the class intended to be protected. They point to the Declara-
tion of Public Policy, which states that economic insecurity due to unemploy-
ment and the resulting burden of indigency is to be prevented, and protest
18 Smith v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 187 Pa. Super. 560, 146 A.2d 59
(1958). Allocatur was allowed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. As of this writing the case
has not been decided.
19 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 801 (1936). This section provides that no employer shall require
a waiver of unemployment compensation as a condition of employment.
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that pregnancy is more the result of natural law than it is individual whim.
They maintain that the rigors of unemployment are even harder to with-
stand when pregnant, and that employers should not be allowed to control
the denial of benefits on the basis of unilateral lay-off rules in pregnancy
cases; that it is unfair to allow arbitrary dismissal for a sustained period of
someone who is both able and willing to continue in her work. The legis-
lature, it is asserted, in setting time limits for the drawing of benefits by
pregnant claimants meant to rule out only those who could no longer work
because of pregnancy.
MARRIED WOMEN
A married woman who leaves her employment in order to live with her
husband has been adjudged by the courts as not being disqualified from un-
employment compensation by reason of her leaving. The first two cases in
which this view was maintained, Teicher Unemployment Compensation Case 20
and the Sturdevant Unemployment Compensation Case,21 concerned women
who had left defense jobs during the Second World War in order to join their
husbands who were in the armed forces. In the former the claimant was
disqualified in spite of the court's -ruling on the validity of her reason for
leaving her employment because she removed herself from the labor market
by moving to an army post. Justification for the ruling in the Sturdevant
case was found in the dicta of the Teicher holding, in the legal right of the
husband to select the marital domicile and in the corresponding duty of the
wife to reside with him. Compliance with that duty was held to satisfy the
requirement of "good cause" for leaving employment. To further buttress
this interpretation of the statutory requirement, the court pointed out that
at a time when other jurisdictions were changing the wording of their statutes
to avoid this meaning, the Pennsylvania General Assembly, in response to
a call from Governor James to liberalize the unemployment compensation
law, used the words "good cause". And, after the court had made its decision
in the Teicher case, the legislature amended that section of the act but retained
the words "good cause". 2
These decisions have been the subject of severe criticism, and have been
singled out for rebuke by both the Supreme and Superior courts of Pennsyl-
20 154 Pa. Super. 250, 35 A.2d 739 (1943).
21 Also known as Blilley Elec. Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 159 Pa.
Super. 548, 45 A.2d 898 (1946).
22 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §802(b) (1953). A later amendment took out "good cause"
and substituted "necessitous and compelling." As a result the bureau stopped payments to married
women who had left work to be with their husbands, but the policy was subsequently reversed and
benefits to such claimants are now being paid.
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vania.23 It would seem that a case arising on the above principle would be
overruled, but when deciding the In Re Mills Unemployment Compensation
Case,2 the Superior Court ruled that the Supreme Court should pass upon
this holding and the case was certified to the Supreme Court, which responded
by quashing the writ on the grounds that the Department of Labor had no
right to appeal.2"
As the situation stands the only restriction placed upon this type claim-
ant concerns the labor conditions in the area to which she moves. If there
is an adequate opportunity, equal or nearly so, for employment in her par-
ticual job skill, benefits will be granted.
DOUBLE DIPPERS
In accordance with the law, unemployment compensation benefits are
paid according to wages earned by the claimant during his "base year". "Base
year" is defined in the law as ". . . the first four of the last five completed
calendar quarters immediately preceding the first day of an individual's benefit
year." "
With payments contingent upon wages earned during the "base year",
and the "base year" ending three to six months prior to the date of the claim,
many claimants are eligible, after the expiration of thirty weeks of benefits,
to apply for additional compensation since they have worked during some
part of the "base year" in operation at the time of the second application.
For example: a claimant whose last day of work was October 30, 1957, and
who applied for benefits on November 1, 1957, would have a base year upon
which to claim, from July 1, 1956, through June 30, 1957. Then, if he was
still unemployed on November 1, 1958, even though he has drawn the maxi-
mum of thirty weeks' benefits, he can file for compensation and the base
year in operation at that time is July 1, 1957, thru June 30, 1958, a part of
which he was employed. He will be entitled to draw more benefits." Such
a claimant is called a Double Dipper.
The most discouraging feature of the Double Dipper loophole is the
tendency of other loophole claimants to reach into the second round of bene-
fits, strongly indicating the validity of the contention that the loophole claim-
ants are in reality out of the labor market. Approximately thirty-three per-
2- Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 358 Pa.
224, 56 A.2d 254 (1948); Edwards v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 184 Pa. Super.
262, 132 A.2d 897 (1957).
24 164 Pa. Super. 421, 65 A.2d 436 (1949).
25 362 Pa. 342, 67 A.2d 214 (1949).
26 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 753 (1951).
27 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 804 (1955).
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cent of retired claimants collecting during the second quarter of 1958 were
in their second round. About ten percent of the women whose unemploy-
ment was connected with pregnancy were in their second round. But only
two percent of the "laid off" claimants were in their second round. 8
CONCLUSIONS
Although the accident of date is determinative of many rights and duties
under our system of law where there is no other feasible method of adminis-
tering those facets of the law, there is little reason for the legislature to
allow the continued use of the formula outlined above in the payment of
benefits. To permit this is an encouragement to certain claimants to resist
employment rather than actively seek it. If -the intention of the legislature
is to allow thirty weeks' benefits, then the statute should so state. If the in-
tention is to allow benefits for a longer period, the legislature should so pro-
vide, but allowing extra benefits to some who just "happen" to have been laid
off near the end of a quarter is, at best, unreasonable.
Concerning the other loophole claimants, it is evident that not all in
any particular class lack sincerity of motive. Some, such as the pregnant
woman who is able to work and wants to work, find unemployment resulting
in a greater financial burden than most normal "laid, off" claimants. Others
want to continue working but are bound to retire because of a contract made
for them concerning which they had little control. The purpose in the en-
actment of the Unemployment Compensation Law was, as pointed out in the
Declaration of Public Policy, to provide security against the burden caused
by lack of work, and to keep, as long as possible, the victims of unemploy-
ment from becoming wards of the Commonwealth. Legislation to eliminate
payments to a particular class because some members of the class are improper
recipients of payments is no more justified than allowing benefits to all per-
sons, regardless of the reasons for their unemployment.
The menace to the Unemployment Compensation Law, as to most social
legislation, lies not in -theory, but in abuse. The law, in stating the qualifi-
cations for securing benefits, allows its administrators a great deal of dis-
cretion in prescribing additional requirements for demonstrating a person's
good faith. Requiring a Bureau doctor to pass upon the individual's em-
ployment capacity would serve to eliminate those who are not properly mem-
bers of the labor force. Requiring the claimant to actively seek employment
rather than remain passive until referred by the Employment Service would
28 See note 7 supra.
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not be unreasonable especially in view of the fact that a claimant is supposed
to be available for work at all times during the week for which he is claim-
ing. Requiring claimants, particularly those who cannot be contacted by
telephone, to visit the Employment Office more than the once a week neces-
sary to sign for benefits would also help to filter out those individuals who
are more interested in a paid vacation than work.
It is suggested that a system whereby claimants are issued two or three
cards each week, which are to be signed by employers with whom the claimant
has in good faith consulted concerning employment, ought to be established.
This would give the Bureau a convenient means of establishing the sincerity
of the claimant's motive.
The cooperation of employers in hiring through the Employment Serv-
ice and irr.promptly reporting claimants, who refuse suitable work, is neces-
sary to any efficient administration of the act. Since it is the employers who
are paying the bill, through their contributions to the Unemployment Com-
pensation Fund, and since, by and large, employers are the severest critics
of the administration of the Law, such cooperation should be forthcoming.
In this, as in all forms of social activity, the pendelum of public think-
ing vacillates from one extreme of the arc to the other. Rational people
recognize that neither extreme is the remedy,. for overcorrection of any evil
always produces an equal evil as a replacement. Unless the proper correc-
tive measures are taken, public animosity toward the relatively small group of
individuals who are abusing the philosophy of Unemployment Compensa-
tion may cause legislation which will overcorrect and be grossly unfair to
a much larger group of honest people.
JOHN P. THOMAS.
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